it seek refuge in any denunciation of "Western" academic fashions. To be a Marxist is to work within European traditions of thought, anyway. There cannot be, at least for a non-Western Marxist, any indigenist argument for ignoring theoretical movements in the West. I assume that whether or not one agrees with the likes of Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, and others, one needs to engage with their writings, which have drawn some serious question marks against ideas like "emancipation," "universal history/subject," and so on, which never looked problematic within the Marxist canon. But I also think that this engagement has to issue from our particular positions. In my case, this is one of an intellectual who lives and works in Australiaand is therefore subject to the currents of global and local positioning that this creates-but who nevertheless also thinks out of an imaginary base in India. I say this particularly in the context of my involvement in the Indiadtransnational project Subaltern Studies (1982-). My remarks on rethinking the current problems of Marxist history writing should be situated in that context.
Subaltern Studies began as an argument within Indian Marxism and in
particular against the teleologies that colonialist and nationalist-Marxist narratives had promoted in the 1970s in the field of Indian history. Initially we wanted to oppose the methodological elitism of both varieties, but our aim was also to produce "better" Marxist histories. It soon became clear, however, as our research progressed, that a critique of this nature could hardly afford to ignore the problem of universalism/Eurocentrism that was inherent in Marxist (or for that matter liberal) thought itself.
This realization made us receptive to the critiques of Marxist histori-some postmodernists. This was not because we believed in any Habermasian project of retrieving Enlightenment reason from the clutches of an all-consuming instrumental rationality. Our attachment to Marx's thought has different roots. They go back to the question of European imperialism from which the problem of Indian modernity cannot be separated. (The question of colonial modernity, or I might say the question of colonialism itself, remains an absent problem in much poststructuralisdpostmodern writing.) However, for a modern Indian intellectual -that is, someone who engages in serious commerce with the thought-products of the European Enlightenment and with their inheritances and legacies but someone who is also aware, from the cultural practices of Indian society, of there always being other possibilities of "worlding," which now exist in uneven and often subordinate relationship to "Western metaphysics" (forgive this summary expression)-for such an intellectual it is difficult to trash Marx's thought so summarily. Again, this is not because it is difficult to sympathize with the intellectual criticisms of historicism. (I will in fact go on to argue here that these criticisms have to be made central to our reading of Marx.) It is because critical narratives of imperialism are constitutive of our collective origin-myths. The story of becoming an "Indian" academic-intellectual and having no other realistic option but to deal in and with thoughts that never fail to remind you of their European origins does not make sense unless there is a concomitant narrative locating the emergence of such an intellectual class in the history of capitalistEuropean imperialism.
To say this is not to claim the privileges of the "victim." Imperialism enables as much as it victimizes. Without English imperialism in India and a certain training in Anglo-Euro habits of thought, there would not have been any Subaltern Studies. The story of "capital"-that is, political-economic analysis of the emergence of the market society in Europe, which is undeniably a historicist narrative in the most popular recensions-has a central place in our collective self-fashioning. It follows then that Marx's critique of capital and commodity will be indispensable if we want to develop any critical understanding of ourselves. How can a critique of modernity in India ignore the history of commodification in that society?
At the same time, this relationship to Marx cannot any longer be the straightforward one that the Indian Communist parties once encouraged, where the scripting of our histories on the lines of some already-told European drama posed no intellectual problems for self-understanding.
As deconstructive political philosophy increasingly ponders the intractable problem of a genuinely "non-violative" relationship between the Self (the West) and its Other, and turns to questions of difference and ethics-questions made urgent by the current globalization of capital, information, and technology-the task for students of Marx in my part of the world does not seem to be one of improving "Marxism" in order to make it impregnable against further assault from the postmodernists. Much in Marx is truly nineteenth-century, gender-blind, and obviously Eurocentric. A postcolonial reading of Marx would have to ask if and how, and which of, his categories could be made to speak to what we have learned from the philosophers of "difference" about "responsibility" to the plurality of the world. The age of multinational capital devolves on us this responsibility to think "difference" not simply as a theoretical question but as a tool for producing practical possibilities for action.
Talk of "difference" often elicits a hostile response from Marxists. There appear to be a couple of things at stake. There is, first of all, the longingrained habit of thinking the world through the common, and seemingly universal and solidarity-producing, language of Marxist prose. Secular history itself is a master code implicit in modern political thought. Historians are comfortable with the talk of difference so long as the talk does not threaten the very idea of history itself. This produces a second-order problem to which there is no quick and ready-made solution and which therefore looks to many like an intellectual dead end. How would conversation proceed between two historians if "differences" could not be contained within the sameness of the very code (i.e., History) that made the conversation possible in the first place? One may legitimately ask: How can one write/think/talk the non-West in academia without in some sense anthropologizing it?
Most historians would prefer to stop at this point and simply get on with the job. Progressive historians would perhaps even endorse the strategy of "anthropologizing": they would in effect argue that it is part and parcel of the struggle to make the world more democratic. After all, what material benefits can the subaltern classes gain from imaginations in which gods, spirits, humans, and animals inhabit the same world? For these historians, it is not much help to point out that a secular and modern historical consciousness is itself part of the problem of "colonization of the mind" for many "traditions" such as those of the "Hindus." (I am not making a universal claim here, and I have put the word "Hindu" in quotes to indicate its socially constructed and contingent nature.)
Yet, as an Indian historian, this is where I think we confront an almost insoluble problem in writing subaltern history. The problem is also of some critical urgency in India. For most Hindus, gods, spirits, and the so-called supernatural have a certain "reality." They are as real as "ideology" is-that is to say, after 2iiek, they are embedded in practices. The secular calendar is only one of the many time-worlds we travel. Bringing together these different time-worlds in the construction of a modern public life in India has always had something to do with all the major crises modern India has had to endure, the most recent being the current upsurge of a fascistic Hindu movement that has already caused enormous sufferings to the Muslims. The usual vocabulary of political science in India, which discusses this problem in terms of European categories of the secular and the sacred and makes this into a question (recycled from European history) of "religion" in public life, is pathetically inadequate in its explanatory capacity. The word "religion," everybody agrees, captures nothing of the spirit of all the heterodox Hindu practices it is meant to translate. For however cynical one may be in one's analysis of the "reasons" why the Hindu political parties may want to use the "Hindu" card, one still has to ask questions about the many different meanings that divine figures (such as the god-king Rama) assume in our negotiations of modernity. This is where I return to the dilemma I posed in the previous paragraph: Do we simply anthropologize these meanings in the already universal language of Marxist prose? Or, in developing a Marxist prose suited to our struggles (i.e., the struggles that arise for modern Indian intellectuals from their being situated in a colonial modernity), do we also struggle to inscribe horizons of radical otherness into the visions of Marx's critique of capital?
I cannot pretend to escape these problems any more than other Marxists can, nor do I aspire to do so. The very limited question I can deal with in this short space is this: Do Marx's categories allow us to follow the traces of what they cannot themselves enclose? Can we engage with the problem of "universality" of capital without committing ourselves to a bloodless liberal pluralism that subsumes all difference(s) within the Same?
Looking back at some work I did on (Indian) "working-class" history a few years ago, I only seem to have half-thought through the problem. I documented a history whose narrative(s) produced several points of friction with the teleologies of "capital." In my study (1989) of the jute-mill workers of colonial Bengal I tried to show how the production relations in these mills were structured from the inside, as it were, by a whole series of relations that could only be considered "precapitalist." The coming of capital and commodity did not appear to lead to the politics of equal rights that Marx saw as something constitutive of these categories. I refer here in particular to the critical distinction Marx draws between real and abstract labor in explaining the production and form of the commodity. This is how I then read the distinction, with enormous debt to Michel Henry (1983) and
I. I. Rubin (1975):
rights" of "abstract individuals," whose political life is reflected in the ideals and practice of "citizenship." The politics of "equal rights" is thus precisely the "politics" one can read into the category "capital." (Chakrabarty 1989: 225-226) It now seems to me that Marx's category of "commodity" has a certain built-in openness to "difference" that I did not fully exploit in my exposition. My reading of the term "precapital" remained, in spite of my efforts, hopelessly historicist, and my narrative never quite escaped the (false) question, Why did the Indian working class fail to sustain a long-term sense of class-consciousness? The metaproblem of "failure" itself arises from the well-known Marxist tradition of positing the working class as a world-historical but transcultural subject. It is also clear from the above quotation that my reading took the ideas of the individual and personality as unproblematically given, and read the word "real" (in "real labor") to mean something primordially natural (and therefore not social).
But my larger failure lay in my inability to see that if one read the "real" as socially/culturally produced-and not as a Rousseauian "natural," something that refers simply to the different endowments of different, ahistorical, individuals-other possibilities open up, among them the one of writing "difference" back into Marx. For the "real," in this reading, must refer to different kinds of "social" and hence to different orders of temporality. It should in principle even allow for the possibility that these temporal horizons are mutually incommensurable. The transition from real to abstract then becomes also a question of transition from many and possibly incommensurable temporalities to the homogeneous time of abstract labor, the transition from nonhistory to history. Real labor, therefore, is precisely that which cannot not be enclosed by the sign commodity while it always inheres in the latter. The gap between real and abstract labor and the force constantly needed to close that gap is what introduces the movement of "difference" into the very constitution of the commodity and thereby eternally defers its achievement of its truehdeal character.
The sign "commodity," as Marx explains, will always carry certain universal emancipatory narratives as parts of its internal structure. If one overlooked the tension Marx situated at the heart of this category, these narra-tives could indeed produce the standard teleologies one normally encounters in Marxist historicism: that of citizenship, the juridical subject of Enlightenment thought, the subject of political theory of rights, and so on. Although these narratives have practical utility in modern political structures, the more interesting problem for the Marxist historian is the problem of temporality, about which the category "commodity," constituted through the tension between "real" and "abstract" labor, invites us to think. If real labor, as we have said, belongs to a world of heterogeneity whose various temporalities-Michael Taussig's (1980) work on Bolivian tin miners clearly shows that they are not even all "secular" (i.e., bereft of gods and spirits)-cannot be enclosed in the sign History, then it can find a place in a historical narrative of capitalist transition (or commodity production) only as a Derridean trace of something that cannot be enclosed, an element that constantly challenges from within capital's and commodity's-and by implication, History's-claims to unity and universality.
The prefixpre in "precapital," it could be said similarly, is not a reference to what is simply chronologically prior to capital on an ordinal, homogeneous scale of time. "Precapitalist" is a hybrid identity; it speaks of a particular relationship to capital marked by the tension of difference in horizons of time. The "precapitalist" can only exist within the temporal horizon of capital, and yet it disrupts the continuity of this time by suggesting other times that are not on the same, secular, homogeneous calendar (which is why what is precapital is not chronologically prior to capital). Theoretically, these other times could be entirely incommensurable with the godless, spiritless time of the post-Renaissance conception of "History."
Subaltern histories, thus conceived in relationship to the question of difference, will have a split running through them. On the one hand, they are "histories" in that they are constructed within the master-code of secular History and use the accepted academic codes of history writing (and thereby perforce anthropologize all other forms of memory). On the other hand, they cannot ever afford to grant this master-code its claim to be a mode of thought that comes to all human beings naturally, or even to be treated as something that exists out there in nature itself-remember the telltale title of J.B.S. Haldane's book Euerything Has a History (1951). Subaltern histories are therefore constructed within a particular kind of histori-cized memory, one that remembers History itself as a violation, an imperious code that accompanied the civilizing process that the European Enlightenment inaugurated in the eighteenth century as a world-historical task. This memory does not have the character of nostalgia, for it bespeaks a pain that is in no sense historical in our parts of the world.
The empirical historians who write these histories are not peasants or tribals (and often not even women). Historians produce history -as distinct from other forms of memory-precisely because they have been transposed and inserted (in our case, by England's work in India) into the global narratives of citizenship and socialism. They write history, that is, only after their own labor has entered the process of being made abstract in the world market for ideational commodities. The subaltern, then, is not the empirical peasant or tribal in any straightforward sense that a populist program of history writing may want to imagine. The figure of the subaltern is necessarily mediated by problems of representation. In terms of the analysis that I have been trying to develop here, one might say that subaltern is what fractures from within the signs that tell of the insertion of the historian (as a speaking subject) into the global narratives of capital. It is what gathers itself under "real" labor in Marx's critique of capital, the figure of difference that governmentality-in Foucault's sense of the termall over the world has to subjugate and civilize.
There are implications that follow: subaltern histories written with an eye to difference cannot constitute yet another attempt in the long and universalistic tradition of "socialist" histories to help erect the subaltern as the subject of modern democracies-that is, to expand the history of the modern in such a way as to make it more representative of society as a whole. This is a laudable objective on its own terms and has undoubted global relevance. But thought does not have to stop at political democracy or the concept of egalitarian distribution of wealth. Though the aim of achieving these ends will legitimately fuel many immediate political struggles, this kind of thought is fundamentally insensitive to philosophical questions of difference and can acknowledge difference only as a practical problem. Subaltern histories will engage philosophically with questions of difference that are elided in the dominant traditions of Marxism. At the same time, however, just as real labor cannot be thought outside the problematic of abstract labor, the subaltern cannot be thought outside the global narrative of capital, though it does not belong to this narrative. Stories about how this or that group in Asia, Africa, or Latin America resisted the "penetration" of capitalism do not constitute subaltern history, for subaltern histories, as I conceive of them here, do not refer to a resistance prior and exterior to capital. Subaltern Studies can only situate itself theoretically at the juncture where we give up neither Marx nor "difference," for the resistance it speaks of is something that can happen only within the time-horizon of capital, and yet it disrupts the unity of that time. Unconcealing the tension between real and abstract labor ensures that capitakommodity has heterogeneities and incommensurabilities inscribed in its core.
Or, to put it differently, the practice of subaltern history would aim to take history to a point where its unworking becomes visible.
Marxism, Historical Time, and Other Temporalities
Some readers of the preceding section have suggested that I elaborate with a few examples some of my points about historical and other temporalities and the idea of their "incommensurability." I will do it with the aid of an everyday Australian example and a historical example from my own research.
First, a point about how a conception of historical time, which is inherently elitist, is naturalized in the everyday speech of the middle classes. is a certain habit of thought: the imagination of time that is built into this use of the word contemporary. The word speaks a double gesture, and an implicit acceptance of this gesture between the author and the reader is the condition that enables the sentence to communicate its point. The gesture is double because it is at the same time a gesture of inclusion and exclusion. Obviously, contemporary refers to all that belongs to a "culture" at a particular point on the (secular) calendar that the author and the intended reader of this statement inhabit. Yet surely it is not being claimed that every element in the culture is moving toward the destination that the author has identified in the films mentioned. What about, for instance, the parents of someone like myself, were they to be in Australia permanently? I cannot imagine them as having anything much to do with The Last of the Mohicans even though they would be as much a part of the calendrical "now" as anybody else. If we do not assume that their culture was "static" in any way, that they were also going somewhere -though obviously not where The
Last of the Mohicans takes us-then obviously they are not included in the "place" that the statement sees as the next stopping point of "contemporary culture." This is the gesture of exclusion that is an inherent part of the word "contemporary" as During uses it. The word "contemporary," whenever used to convey a sense of history, is never a disinterested word. Its historicist, as distinct from literal, use is always political. Some (the speaker included) are always more contemporary than others. The implicit claim is not that the others are not moving; it is rather that whatever futures these others are building for themselves will soon be swamped by the future that one divines on the basis of his reading of evidence.
If this sounds like too strong a claim, try the following thought experiment. Suppose we argue that the contemporary is actually plural, so radically plural that it is not possible for any particular aspect or element to claim to represent the whole in any way (even as a possible future). Under these conditions, a statement such as the one I have quoted would be impossible to make. We would instead have to say that "contemporary culture," being plural and equal within plurality, was going many different places at the same time (I have problems with "at the same time," but let's stay with it for the present). Then there would be no way of talking about the "cutting edges," the avant-garde, the latest that represents the future, the most modern, and so on. Without such a rhetoric and a vocabulary, and the sentiments that go with them, however, many of our everyday political strategies in the scramble for material resources would be impossible to pursue. How would you get government backing, research funding, institutional approval for an idea if you could not claim on its behalf that it represents the more "dynamic" (or "progressive"-though the word is now tainted) part of the "contemporary," which thus is pictured as something always already split into two, one part rushing headlong into the future, and another passing away into the past, something like the "living dead'' in our midst. (This is where I think my parents would belong, people waiting for death to realize in a physical form the "fact" of their obsolescence.) That is why the statement quoted from During has a certain terrorizing element to it. This terrorism is independent of authorial intention, for it is built into the historical construction of time that is invested in the word "contemporary." It addresses the reader's anxiety to survive. It says to him that if he wants to be where the future of "contemporary culture" is, he must relate to
The Last of the Mohicans; otherwise he is not truly "contemporary." Who would want to be left behind?
This tyranny and the reader's anxiety are both in a sense "real." For "contemporary culture" is never simply a collection of cultural practices whose plurality could be studied with the pleasure and the innocence of the nineteenth-century anthropologist. Nor is the future simply a matter of random conjecture. Its making depends on the forces of both political and libidinal economies, and how they work in combination with subtle and not-so-subtle means of institutional coercion. My point, then, is this. The double gesture built into the idea of the contemporary is symptomatic of the structure of historical time. This structure is impossible to imagine without looking on society through some variant of the now discredited modernity/tradition binary. (The Marxist version of this sensibility is contained in the concept of the "simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous.") This binary is deeply implicated in the politics and the legitimizing narratives of the institutions of modernity (and we have not invented any postmodern bureaucracies yet).
The historian's understanding of time -of society as a layered, sedimented object, an image derived from evolutionist thought-is therefore never innocent of politics. Yet it is its naturalization, the everyday redundancies of its meaning, that allows During's statement to come to us with all the force of a quiet, casual remark. The very "casual" nature of the remark is, of course, a sure sign of how hegemonic the historical understanding of time must be to those who read and write for newspapers.
It should be clear by now that solution to the problem of historical time is not a simple mind flip. I am not saying, "Hey, let's allow for plurality, let's not name where the future's going, and all will be fine." I grew up in an India which had internalized this meaning of "contemporaneity ": it had already discarded Gandhi and Gandhians as "inspiring and irrelevant"; I know how much more powerful the story of capitalist development is, compared to all other visions of society; I know how, to groups that are already dominant and powerful, a capitalist modernity has always seemed to embody the most reasonable social arrangement possible. I have seen the consumerist Indian middle classes being hooked on "Santa Barbara" and "The Bold and the Beautiful" relayed to them on Star Television from Hong Kong. At the same time, I have cousins who are too poor, too malnourished, and too caught up in their struggle for existence to enjoy this latest benefit of globalization; I also have some knowledge of the tremendous and effective instruments of violence that modern institutions can mobilize. Unlike many other Foucauldians, therefore, I believe in the capacity of the police to make the law real. I am not about fairy-tale solutions. During's statement scares me because it is so true! But there is nothing "natural" about this truth. So long as we need history as a legitimizing device deeply imbricated in the procedures of our institutional lives, there is no getting away from the historical understanding of time. The point is to denaturalize it.
It is important to think about how we might, in writing history, write the limits of the conception of time that historians work with. Usually, this time is treated as part of the natural order of things. Irrespective of a society's own understanding of temporality, a historian will always be able to produce a time line for the globe whose structure is like this:
It does not matter if any of these areas were inhabited by peoples such as the Hawaiians or the Hindus who (unlike, as some would say, the Chinese or the Arabs) did not have a "sense of history"-as distinct from other forms of memories-before European arrival. Contrary to whatever these people may have thought and however they may have organized their memories, the historian has the capacity to put them back into a time we all are supposed to have shared, consciously or not. History as a code thus invokes a natural, homogeneous, secular, calendrical time without which the story of human evolutiodcivilization-a single human history, that is-cannot be told. In other words, the code of the secular calendar that frames historical explanations has this claim built into it: independent of culture or consciousness, people exist in historical time. That is why it is always possible to discover "history" (say after European contact) even if you were not aware of its existence in the past. History is supposed to exist in the same way as the earth does, for instance. Philosophically speaking, this time is nothing but a useful fiction, or a set of conventions, a system of representations, which becomes "real" (or achieves its truth-effect) only within a particular framework of perception and practice, that has been proclaimed by several popular books on modern physics ever since the invention of the theories of relativity. (What would space-time curvature mean for the sense of time we deploy in history?) Yet most historians choose to take the secular chronology of causation for granted, as something entirely natural, their basic mythological "code." Two exceptions, among a few others, are Greg Dening (1980 ) and Ranajit Guha (1983 , 1988 .
The evidence, however, quite clearly points to the existence of many different fractures in the assumed homogeneity of the semiotic field called history. Here I raise the question of noncommensurable temporalities-that is, conceptions of time that cannot be measured by the same scale and where conversion from one to the other is impossible (just as a lot of "facts" about the nature of the physical universe, explicable only in the symbolic language of higher mathematics and physics, cannot be conveyed through ordinary prose: you either know the world through that language or you don't). Let me adduce an example from my research in labor history for it will also allow me to return directly to the point I have already raised in discussing Marx's categories of real and abstract labor-the project of writing difference back into capital. Consider the following description from the 1930s of a particular festival (that is still quite common in India), which entails the worshipping of machinery by workers:
In some of the jute mills near Calcutta the mechanics often sacrifice goats at this time [autumn] [and] the head is deposited in the. . . sacred Ganges. . . . (Chakrabarty 1989: 89-90) This particular festival is celebrated in many parts of north India as a public holiday for the working class, the day being named after the engineer-god Vishvakarma. How do we read this evidence in terms of the difference between real and abstract labor-that is, in terms of a Marxist narrative? To the extent that this day has now become a "public" holiday in India, it has obviously been subjected to a process of bargaining between employers, workers, and the state. One could also argue that, if the ideas of "recreation" and "leisure" belong to a discourse of what makes labor efficient and productive, this "religious" holiday itself belongs to the process through which labor is managed and disciplined and is hence a part of the history of emergence of abstract labor in the commodity form (for the very "public" nature of the holiday shows that it has been written into an emergent national, secular calendar of production). We could thus produce a secular narrative that would apply, really, to any working-class holidays having to do with religion. Christmas or the Muslim festival Id could be seen in the same light. T h e difference between Vishvakarma puja (worship) and Christmas (or Id) would then be explained anthropologically, that is, by holding another master code -culture or religion-constant and universal. This difference between religions is by definition incapable of bringing the category culture or religion, or for that matter history, into any kind of crisis. But does every people have culture? Is religion a universal category? Or, as I have asked before, does the Hindu word dharma translate as "religion"?
This attempt to translate across heterogeneities by appeal to some particular code-a naturalized sense of historical time, in this case-that is also held to be constant and universal, is what produces the elitism of the historian's idea of the contemporary. As Michel de Certeau says in discussing G. E. Swanson's work on the Reformation, "The central place awarded to one category of signs establishes the possibility of classifying others as 'delays' or 'resistances' and furnishes the base-or a partial base-for a 'coherence,' for a 'mentality,' or for a system to which everything is referred" (Certeau 1988: 120-121 ). The politics of writing history in such a way as to bring the very code into crisis must lie in developing a political-ethical task of the historian: attending to the fractures in the semiotic field called "history" so that what is unrepresentable is at least allowed to make visible the laws and limits of a system of representation. The Indian mill-workers' worshipping of machinery as an incarnation of the god Vishvakarma produces a fracture in the code of the historian's secular chronology and causation. It refers to another temporality whose specificity is unthinkable within the code of history. To call it the "simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous" or to see it as a "vestige" or a "continuity" from "an earlier time" or even as merely another instance of "invention of tradition" is to treat "difference" as ineffective and history as a universal to which everything else is convertible. It is to act as though history, the knowledge-formation, were not a system of representation, as though it were something that did its own work behind and unbeknownst to us, as natural processes are often thought to be doing. It is, finally, not to take any responsibility for the implication of history, its logic of representation, in the workings of the institutions that govern our lives. Lest I be misunderstood, let me repeat myself carefully: I am not saying that the code of history does not apply to my jute-mill workers in Calcutta. But I am saying that this code represents a partial and situated knowledge, which derives its validity within the practice of certain institutions (which must include those of law, the nation-state and the university). There is an outside to this code. There are other ways of worlding that are beyond history. While our scientific truths are the same, our gods and spirits are often interestingly different. The modern exists by converting a lot of this difference into "relics" and monuments.
The real labor of my mill workers, then-let us say their relationship to their own labor on the day of Vishvakarmapuja -is obviously a part of the world in which both they and the god Vishvakarma exist in some sense (it would be silly to reduce this existence to a question of conscious belief). History cannot represent, except through a process of translation and consequent loss of status and signification for the translated, the temporality of that world. History as a code comes into play as this real labor gets transformed into the homogeneous, disciplined world of abstract labor, of the generalized world of exchange where every exchange will be mediated by the sign "commodity." Yet, as the story of the Vishvakarmapuja in the Calcutta mills shows, "real" labor inheres in the commodity and its secularized biography; its presence, never direct, leaves its effect in the breach that story makes in history's system of representation. As I have already said, the breach cannot be mended by anthropological cobbling, for that only shifts the methodological problems of secular narratives onto another, cognate territory. In developing Marxist histories after the demise of Communist party "Marxisms," our task is to write and think this breach as we write history (for we cannot avoid writing history). If history is to become a site where pluralities will contend, we need to develop ethics and politics of writing that will show history, this gift of modernity to many peoples, to be constitutionally incapable of living up to its self-proclaimed aims: to reenact the past, or to describe how it really happened. 
